Constitutional Background for State Reorganization I. by Edwards, Wm H
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 3 Number 2 Article 3 
1926 
Constitutional Background for State Reorganization I. 
Wm H. Edwards 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
Recommended Citation 
Edwards, Wm H. (1926) "Constitutional Background for State Reorganization I.," North Dakota Law 
Review: Vol. 3 : No. 2 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol3/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND FOR STATE REORGAN-
IZATION. I.
Wm. H. EDWARDS*
For the past decade a movement for the reconstruction of State
governments has been sweeping the country. It has been promoted,
on the one hand, by political scientists and reform organizations, and,
on the other, by spoilsmen and economy-politicians. Its purpose,
in brief, is to center all political and administrative responsibility in
the governor. Its ideal of constitutional structure is the U. S. "federal
plan." Unfortunately, this cure-all, like the primaries, the initiative
and referendum, the direct election of executive officials, the "federal
plan" cities, and commission government cities, has failed to turn
the trick and soon will be buried in the potters field of political
panaceas. Scandals in the states where reorganization codes prevail
are known throughout the land. Illinois, the first to adopt the plan,
is only one of them. The eventual breakdown of the codes was ap-
parent from the start. All the while, the political medicine men who
conceived the plan have been saying, "Wait, we shall see; it is too
soon to criticise." We have been waiting for the past ten years.
Is it not yet time to speak? Some leaders of the movement have
admitted openly the failure of the scheme; others have not publicly
admitted their disillusionment because their books and articles have
given them a property right in the movement.
Why has the plan been unsuccessful? In a word, because it has
violated almost every elementary principle of politics since Aristotle.
It will be considered carefully in historical perspective giving credit
where credit is due.** The subject is divided into five main topics
(of which only topics i and 2 will be considered in this issue)
(i) The fundamentals of government organization,
(2) The evolution of U. S. state constitutional structure,
(3) The history and nature of the state reorganization move-
ment,
(4) Criticism of the movement, and,
(5) Prospects for the future.
FUNDAMENTALS OF GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION.-
A preliminary statement of the basic constitutional principles is parti-
cularly useful because promoters of recent reorganization schemes
have disregarded or misinterpreted them. Almost all political philoso-
phers, ancient, mediaeval and modern, have classified governments on
the basis of the theory of separation of powers. That is to say, the
nature of the relationship of certain branches of government (usually
the executive, legislative and judicial) has been the key to grouping
governments. The classical types arising from variations in the rela-
tion of these powers were monarchy, aristocracy, democracy. But in
more recent times, governments have been divided into two main
categories. In the one the legislative branch is supreme; in the
* Instructor in American History, University of North Dakota.
** This study will be continued in the next issue of the REVIEW.
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other it is not.1 The relative position of the executive and legislative
branches vitally concerns all those who would alter governmental
structure.
"The relation of the Supreme Executive to the Legis-
lative organ is one of the knottiest points in constitutional
construction; it is variously conceived by different theoretical
politicians who agree in accepting the principle of popular con-
trol over legislation, and variously determined in different
modern states in which a popularly elected assembly is actually
a main element of the legislature."
2
Recent state reconstruction codes have been advanced by some
adherents because the governments would thus be converted from the
less efficient check and balance type into the more responsible struc-
ture of legislative supremacy. This claim of transformation is to
be seriously questioned because they accept as their ideal the U. S.
"federal plan" which by no means provides legislative supremacy.
Thus the first and most fundamental question to arise is: What of
the merits of the two types? What has been the attitude of the
leading authorities, past and present, toward them? Strange but
true, these two main types of government are both founded upon the
same basic constitutional theory-the tripartite separation of powers.
Practically all modern constitutions and all American constitutions,
city manager charters excepted, are based on this theory. A few
political theorists contended that, instead of three separate powers,
there should be two, others four, and still others believed that gov-
ernments are or should be a unified system, and therefore, that there
should be no separation of powers.
The classification of governmental powers into three coordinate
and equally balanced parts was the arrangement frequently considered
to have been conceived full grown in the mind of Montesquieu. But
he was by no means the first to propose it. Such ancient philoso-
phers as Aristotle, Cicero and Polybius recognized the doctrine.
Aristotle's structure included a deliberative assembly, a system of
magistracies and a judicial organ.a During the Middle Age, the
theory was unknown, and it was not until 1377 that the doctrine
was again propounded. In that year, Marsiglio of Padua, in his
Defensor Pacis, distinguished between the legislative and executive
powers, the former controlled directly by the people, the latter sub-
ordinate to the former. This he said was "according to the truth
and opinion of Aristotle."" John Locke divided governmental powers
'The first type is signified by such terms as true representative gov-
ernment, parliamentary supremacy, cabinet system (British), controlled
executive, responsible government, legislative supremacy. The other is
known by such titles as multiples agency system, presidential government,
check and balance system, executive government, irresponsible governrhent,
non-parliamentary government, judicial supremacy, divide and rule system,
monarchial-republic. John Adams defined the U. S. federal plan as a"monarchial-republic." Gettell classifies government into two main types
-parliamentary and non-parliamentary government in his, Introduction
to political science, 174. To H. J. Ford the two main types are-true
representative government and multiple agency system; see his Representa-
tive government.
* Sidgwick, Elements of politics, 406.
a Aristotle, Politics, Bk. IV, xiv, et seq.; Dunning, History of political
theories, ancient and mediaeval, 76.
4 Dunning, op. cit., 240; Garner, Introduction to political science, 412.
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into three divisions, but held the legislative to be predominant over
the executive and federative powers. Montesquieu declared his de-
pendence upon Locke for his ideas regarding the separation of powers.
Bluntschli, the German philosopher, in referring to the classic~l
trinity principle, asserted that the legislative stands in a class by it-
self, that all the other functions of the government belong to the par-
ticular while the legislative belongs to the whole body politic. Since
the whole is more than its parts, the legislative must inevitably be
superior to all the other particular powers.6 Thus, it may be rea-
sonably concluded that even among those great philosophers of the
past, who devoted themselves to dividing powers of government on a
tripartite basis, the dictum of "legislative supremacy" 'was accepted,
and the type characterized by complete independence through fine
checks and balances were ignored.
Montesquieu is the one outstanding exception to this general
contention that the legislative power should be supreme over all others.
But his exception is potent because he was accepted without question
by the English speaking people of the Eighteenth Century. Even
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, copied him and his false interpreta-
tion of the British constitution.7 Montesquieu was the "oracle always
consulted and cited on this subject" 8 by our Revolutionary Fathers
and the Framers of the U. S. Constitution. He assumed the great
tradition of British liberty was owing to the structure of their consti-
tution. Perhaps,-but he misinterpreted its structure. He saw the
the legal fiction of a tripartite balance of powers and failed to see the
political reality of a supreme and all-powerful Parliament.9 There-
fore, he was influenced more by his mistaken interpretation of the
British constitution than by his ideal of liberty.
Montesquieu began by accepting Locke's classification of legis-
lative, executive and federative powers. Then he changed the term
federative to judicial, ignored the idea of legislative supremacy, and
extended the trinity of powers theory to the extreme by declaring that
these three general governmental functions should be carried out
by three different bodies of officials.-o These were the mistakes
of Montesquieu. He had no idea of a cabinet "the tie which
binds and the buckle which fastens" the legislative to the executive
organ. In contrast to the other great political philosophers, he favored
an organic separation of functions. It was left to his disciples to
determine what checks and balances should be adopted to force arti-
ficially the separation of one organ from the other.]. Consequently,
although many constitutions have been framed on the basis of his
doctrine, few if any of them are exactly alike because each constitu-
tional convention has adopted different methods of keeping the
"separate powers" separate. Conventions with monarchist leanings
give most checks to the executive; those with democratic sympathies
favor the legislative in distributing the checks; those with aristocratic
sJohn Locke, Two treatises of government. II, xii, 143-6; xiii. See
also, Dunning, History of political theories, Luther to Montesquieu, 358.
sBluntschli, Algemine Staatsleher, I, vii, ch. 7.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England, 17. (Chase ed.)
Federalist, No. 46.
9 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 187.
lo Montesquieu, Espirit de lois, Bk. xi, ch. vi; Dunning, op. cit., 413.
1- Federalist, No. 46.
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tendencies center the controls in the judiciary or the upper house of
the legislature.
There are three main conclusions to be drawn regarding the tri-
partite principle. First, the great philosophers (Montesquieu and his
disciples excepted) held the legislative power supreme. Second, con-
stitution framers following Montesquieu often founded entirely dif-
ferent types of government, some of which quickly reverted to legis-
lative supremacy. Third, the types established depended to a great
extent on the social desires of the framers.
Certain defects in the trinity theory have led to the establishment
of other ideas of governmental powers. The following criticisms are
typical: It was never more than a theory and an ideal not to be
fully realized in practice. 12 The plurality of powers is inconsistent
with the unity of the state. The organic separation of functions is
impossible.13 It is no more feasible to exercise these separately than
it is to exercise the different powers of human beings indepenently.
But, if such separation were practicable, it would, according to Black-
stone, have the same tyrannical effect as the concentration of power
in one body.' 4  Said Rousseau: "They make the sovereign a fantas-
tic being formed of connected parts; it is as if they composed a man
of several bodies, one with eyes, another with arms, another with feet,
and nothing else." 1 5 The trouble with the separation of powers
doctrine, Woodrow Wilson contended was that government was not a
machine but a living thing.
"No living thing can have its organs offset against each
other as checks and live. On the contrary its life depends
on quick cooperation, their ready response to the commands
of instinct or intelligence, their amicable community of pur-
pose. Government is not a body of blind forces; it is a
body of men with highly differentiated functions-but with
a common task and purpose. Their cooperation is indispen-
sable, their warfare fatal. There can be no successful gov-
ernment without leadership or without the intimate coordina-
tion of the organs of life and action. This is not theory
but fact, and displays its force as fact whatever theories may
be thrown across its track."'L
The theory he concluded was successful to the extent it has failed
in reality. Proponents of this theory frequently confused separation
of authority with separation of function. 17 Unless the theory in-
dicates separation of both authority and function, it is so broad and
elastic that it is worthless as a practical rule. The absolute independ-
ence of the departments is impractical because deadlocks arise and in-
efficiency is the consequence. This inefficiency outweighs the ad-
vantages of independence.' 8 And, when it is realized that the chief
12 Goodnow, Politics and administration, 11-12, and Principles of ad-
ministrative law, 3; Bondy, Separation of powers, 117; Treitsche, Poli-
tik, II, 3.
13 Esmein, Droit Constitutional, 369.
14 Garner, op. cit., 421.
35 Rousseau,Social contract, Bk. II, ch. 2.
le Wilson, Constitutional government in U. S., 56.
i- Duguit, Droit constitutional, 319; Cooley, Principles of constitution-
al law, 44.
is Mill, Consideratfions on representative government, 82.
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argument for the separation of powers, namely, the preservation of
liberty, is false, then there is little left to justify the theory.lO In
reality, there is never an equal balance of powers. There may be a
multiplicy of organs but normally one will predominate, and, instead
of powers being equal, they will assume the character of a hierarchy.
And, from the very nature of government, it is the legislative branch
that tends to become supreme. 20
Many critics of the tripartite idea have accepted the dual theory
of parliamentary powers which has developed chiefly in America and
France. In America, Thomas Paine and Benjamin Franklin ad-
vocated this idea during the revolutionary period, and recently F. J.
Goodnow, President of Johns Hopkins University, has led a consider-
able following. In France, Rosseau, DuCrocq and Duguit adopted
the theory. Paine's conception evolved from a fundamental belief
in democracy and a supreme contempt for the British constitution.
He contended in Common Sense "that the English constitution is a
union of three powers reciprocally checking each other is farcical;
either the words have no meaning or they are a flat contradiction .....
The English constitution ..... (is) a house divided against itself."21 In
the Rights of man, he maintained, "We can perceive no more than two
divisions of power, namely, that of legislating or enacting law and that
of executing or administering them."22 In writing Of Constitutions
governments and charters, he declared:
"The general defect in all (American state) constitutions
is that they are modelled too much after the system, if it can
be called a system of the English government, which is the
most corrupt system in existence for it is corruption system-
atized. An ideal also generally prevailed ...... of keeping
what were called the legislative, the executive and the judicial
powers distinct and separated from each other. But this
idea .... is always contradicted in practice; for where. ... a
governor or executive can by a negative prevent an act of the
legislature becoming a law, he is effectually a part of the
legislature and possesses full one-half of the powers of a whole
legislature .......
"When we see maxims that fail in practice, we ought to
go to the root and see if the maxim be true. Now it does
not signify how many nominal divisions, and subdivisions
and classifications we make, for the fact is there are but two
powers in any government, the power of willing or enacting
the laws and the power of executing them; for what is called
the judiciary is a branch of the executive power * ..... ,, 2
The statements in Paine's Dissertation on first principles of gov-
ernment express Dr. Goodnow's attitude:
"The former (the power of willing) corresponds to the
intellectual faculties of the mind which reasons and determines
what shall be done; the second (the power of executing) to
29 Crane and Moses, Politics, 197; Gettell, Introduction to political
science, 228.
2o Goodnow, Comparative administrative law, I, 31; Bluntschli, op, cit,
Bk. vii, ch. 7; Storey, Commentaries, secs., 534, 542.
21 The political writings of Thomas Paine, I, 22. (2 vols., Boston, 1859).
2o Id., II, 191.
2S Id., I, 456-7.
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the mechanical powers of the human body that puts .that
determination into practice. . . . The executive department is
therefore official and is subordinate to the legislative as the
body is to the mind for it is impossible to conceive of the idea
of two sovereignties, a sovereign to will and a sovereign to
act."24
This theory as outlined by Paine, is elaborated in detail by Dr.
Goodnow in his book Politics and administration. He begins by say-
ing, "The action of the state as a political entity consists either in
operations necessary to expression of its will or in operations neces-
sary to the execution of that will."25  The French dualists, including
Duguit and Pradier-Fodere, have expressed the same view that "There
can be but two powers: La Puissance legislatif et la puissance
executif."' 6 All actions of the state or its organs must be in these
two fields. To quote M. DuCrocq: "The mind can conceive of but two
powers: that which makes the law and that which executes it. There
is no place for a third power by the side of the first two."2 , According
to Rosseau:
"The body politic has the same motive powers (as the
individual) ... force and will, the latter under the name legis-
lative power, the former under the name executive power.
Nothing is or ought to be done in it without their coopera-
tion. The legislative power belongs to the people and can
belong to it alone .... The executive power cannot belong to
the people .... because the power is executed only in parti-
cular acts."28
In his trinity theory, Montesquieu not only recognized the separate
functions of government but also the existence of separate govern-
ment authorities and the exercise of one of the powers by each au-
thority. This idea, Dr. Goodnow indicated, was carried farther in
the United States than even Montesquieu intended and therefore was
unworkable.2 9 Dr. Goodnow contended that "the will of the state
must be made up before the act" and that popular government exists
to the extent that the executing body is subordiante to the deliberate
body.3o This relationship is necessary in popular government because
the legislature "in the nature of things can be made much more repre-
sentative than can the executive authority." 3' In the United States,
thanks to the Montesquieuan theory, the legislature is not supreme but
subordinate to the executive. Owing to this situation, Dr. Goodnow
maintains that the powerful political party has developed, in lieu of
the legislature, which "busies itself as much with the election of ad-
ministrative officials as it does with the election of bodies recognized
as distinctly political in character."-- Thus the political machine,
carrying in its wake, spoils corruption, patronage, is necessary in
24 Id., II, 342.
25 Goodnow, Politics and administration 9.
2a Duguit, La separation ses pouvoirs, 73-4; Pradier Fodere, Precis
de detroit administratif.
2- DuCrocq, Trait de droit administratif, I, 29; Cours de droit admin-
istratif, I, 26.
28 Rousseau, op. cit., Bk. III, ch. 1.
29 Goodnow, op cit., 12.
so Id, 10, 24.
s Id., 24.
32 Id., 25; Ford, Representative government, 240.
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America to make the government workable. It is a blessing in
disguise-a refuge from chaos. Incidentally, the writer questions,
whether a state reorganization code, which still further enhances the
power of the executive over the legislative branch, is going to relieve
our political pains.
For our purposes, the chief significance of the dualist theory is
that the trinity dogma is their object of attack and that legislative
supremacy is their ideal type of government.
The outstanding objection to the dualist theory is that "it too
readily accepts a distinction of individual psychology as a standard for
classification. 'Will' and 'act' are taken from use relating to in-
dividuals and applied to the state where we are told it exists in a more
distinct form than in the indivdual."8 8 Although Dr. Goodnow con-
cedes that the details of, will expression are worked out by the execu-
tive, critics claim that will determination on the part of the administra-
tion makes the theory void; that general rules do not always precede
individual acts; that the latter may precede the former or may occur
without leading to a general law. The blanket criticism has been laid
against this as against other theories of powers that there is no theory
that will serve to define the actual work of the various governmental
agencies. But, in spite of these objections, there is much to be said
for the dualist idea.
In addition to the dual and tripartite theories, it has been suggested
at times that there are or should be four separate powers. The con-
stitutions proposed for South America, by Miranda and Bolivar carried
provisions for a fourth power. This moral power served the import-
ant legislative function of watching, supervising and checking the other
three branches. In recent years, as a result of the extension of the
administrative functions, it has been contended that there are in real-
ity two powers within the executive branch, one actually executive and
the other administrative. Since the idea of four powers has carried
little weight, the theory will not be analyzed further.
In England, the rejection of the Montesquieuan theory led not to
dualism but to the unitary idea of representative government. With
the rise of the Utilitarian school in that country, the separation theory
was demolished. Jeramy Bentham, the noted English lawyer and
leader of the Utilitarians, condemned the check and balance theory of
the British constitution as formulated by Blackstone. James Mill
also argued that the theory was worthless as a security for good gov-
ernment, and that the only hope was in the establishment of repre-
sentative government. It was left for John Stuart Mill to write the
classic treaties, Considerations on representative government. He
completely discarded the separation theories and maintained that-"a
balanced constitution is impossible .... There is in every constitution a
strongest power... one which would gain the victory, if .... there
came a trial of strength .... This in England is the popular power ...
for it has substantial supremacy over every department of the govern-
ment .... (It has) control of everything in the last resort.3' If the
advocates of "representative government" were inclined to think in
terms of "powers," their conception of government structure would be
almost identical with the dualists. The late Henry Jones Ford, one of
88 Bentley, The process of government, 327-8.
81 Mill, J. S., Considerations on representative government, 97-100.
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the principal proponents of the unitary idea in America, laid down the
following fundamental conditions for "true representative gov-
ernment :"
(9 .... the people shall be free to choose whom they will to
represent them.
"2 .... the representative assembly shall be face to face with the
administration.
"3 .... the representatives shall be so circumstanced that they can
use their authority only on public account.
"4 .... elections shall be confined to the choice of representatives
(in the legislature).
"5 . ... supervision and control of the representative assembly shall
extend over the whole field of government.Y' 5
Dr. Ford in speaking of the half-truths of Montesquieu's doc-
trine, contended-"the organ of administration and the organ of con-
trol ought to be separately constituted, but the separateness that is
essential to their functional activity cannot be realized in practice un-
less they are directly connected in their operation." Unless the organ of
control (the legislature) is connected with the administration, the
former "sinks in character and ability," representative institutions are
degraded and general political corruption follows.3 6 Thus the propon-
ents of the unitary idea of representative government agree with the
dualists and the large number of trinitarians in rejecting the dogma of
an equipoise of powers and in accepting the practical principle of su-
premacy of the representative body.
The general conclusion on this topic of the fundamentals of gov-
ernment organization is that legislative dominance is the one fund-
amental fact upon which all of the great political philosophers and
authorities on constitutional construction, (with the exception of Mon-
tesquieu and his followers) are agreed. Contrary to this almost
unanimous agreement, the state reorganization movement proposes to
further increase the independence and control of the executive over
the legislative branch.
EVOLUTION OF U. S. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUC-
TURE.-Since the exact type of constitutional structure depends upon
the purposes of the framers, it is necessary to understand their ideas of
the manner in which governments should serve society.
"On the divergence of form and function in these three
elements depends the character of the various constitutions.
It is because these divergencies are practically infinite in num-
ber that the forms of constitutions shade imperceptibly from
one to another of the prominent types." 3 7
The main idea at the time of the framing of the first American
constitutions was that government was a necessary evil to be feared
and hedged at every turn, and, therefore, the government should be
restricted and its powers circumscribed to prevent abuse. Hence, the
various organs should check and balance each other to prevent oppres-
85 Ford, Representative government, 158; see also Ford, Cost of our
national government.
so Id, 181-184; see also Ford, "Causes of political corruption," Scrib-
ners Magazine, XLIX, 57, (Jan. 1911).
av Dunning, History of political theories, ancient and mediaeval, 76.
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sion by the king and his overlords, by arbitrary acts of dictators,
demagogues or what-not.
The tendency at the present time, on the contrary, is toward con-
ceiving of government as a highly desirable institution for society, and
that, therefore, its services should be utilized to the utmost in the inter-
ests of social well being. Consequently, the demand arises for gov-
ernment by competent technicians and administrators unhindered by
checks and balances-a government ordained from the sole viewpoint
of competency in a broad sense. This by no means necessitates the
discovery of a body of supermen to whom will be delegated complete
powers of government and to whom will be handed over the reins of
government forever. Obviously, efficient government cannot be
secured in this way. The various social and economic groups must
contribute their fund of knowledge to the whole in order to solve the
problems of society. Although the expert technicians cannot perform
their work unaided, their service is essential for "the entire business
of government is skilled employment."38
In short, to those who see government as an institution to be en-
dured but not encouraged, it is only natural to accept the Jeffersonian
postulate that the least government is the best. But to those who feel
that government is essential to social welfare the dictum is altered to
read, the best government is the best, or as Pope has said: "For forms
of government let fools contest what ere is best administered is best."
The tendency seems to be toward the latter point of view. It is
toward casting off any inborn fear and superstitious attachment to a
form of government which was conceived many years ago for the
purpose of warding off possible oppression. We are beginning to think
of good government not as protection against tyrants but as services
realized on money invested through taxes.
The question now arises: Is it necessary to discard an old consti-
tutional structure, built to suit the needs of people centuries ago, in
order to further competent administration and to promote the welfare
of present-day society? The answer is in the negative because in the
transition from one viewpoint of the purposes of government to the
ether, it is not essential that the outward forms of government be modi-
fied. The legal fictions of constitutional organization can be retained
while the political realities are vitally altered.
"It is above all necessary to keep in view the distinction
between its idea or essence and the particular forms in which
the idea has been clothed by accidental historical developments
or by the notions current at some particular period."3 9
This is obviously the case in England where the British Crown is
no more than a rubber stamp, a titular executive, a king only in name.
The outward legal structure of the English government is based on
the assumption that the people must be protected against the arbitrary
acts of an executive. The internal political structure is framed to
suit the predominant idea of administering to the needs of the people.
The man versus the state complex is not so much in evidence; the
service state is taking the place of the sovereign state. But British
constitutional organization has evolved gradually as the objects of gov-
as Mill, op. cit., 268.
a9 Id., 97.
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ernment have changed. This evolutionary process is characteristic of
most modern constitutions. Said Woodrow Wilson-"Living poli-
tical constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and in practice."40
The history of the origin and growth of the state governments is
inseparably linked with the federal Constitution. Consequently, it is
necessary to understand the organization of the latter, first, because
it was a model for state constitutions, and, second, because the "federal
plan" has been adopted as the ideal in the recent state reorganization
movement.
There were two ideas of the purpose of government prevailing at
the time of the establishment of the federal Constitution of 1787, both
of which made the man versus the state complex predominant, and
made Montesquieu's tripartite theory acceptable. One was the nega-
tive viewpoint of Jefferson that the best government was the least, and
the other was the fear of unbridled democracy. The latter fear
dominated the members of the Constitutional Convention at Philadel-
phia, for the echoes of Shay's rebellion were still ringing in their ears.
This fear influenced their interpretation of the separation of powers.
The framers gave all possible checks and balances in favor of the
executive and judiciary in order to weaken the legislative branch,
particularly the House of Representatives. The pleas of the adher-
ents of legislative dominance went unheeded. Paine, the advocate
of dualism, had no part in the Convention. Behind the doors of the
Convention, the democrat, Franklin, and the anti-democrat, Roger
Sherman, plead in vain the cause of legislative control. The stand
for executive supremacy was frankly stated in the convention by such
men as Madison, Hamilton and Morris. Madison saw from exper-
ience with the state constitutions that it was not enough merely to state
that the powers were separate but that it was necessary to set up
checks.4X Otherwise legislative preponderance would arise. Hence,
the President was favored in the following respects at the expense of
Congress: First, Congress possessed only specified powers while the
President held plenary powers. Second, he was given the veto power.
Third, care was taken that no provision of the constitution would in-
dicate that the President was in any way subordinate to Congress and
that "his acts were to be as valid as if they proceeded from the legis-
lature."42 Fourth, the President retained the patronage power-"the
principal source of influence." Fifth, he was selected independent of
Congress.
The Method of his selection was one of the chief questions before
the Convention. The Randolph resolution had provided for his
election by the "National Legislature," but it was evident to certain
members that this would give too much influence to the democratic
element. Finally, it was decided that his selection by the electoral
college would guarantee sufficient independence from public opinion,
from the people.' 3
The Presia1ent's patronage power was his most important check
upon Congress. The framers saw this and did not mince words in
40 Woodrow Wilson, op. cit., 56.
41 Federalist, No. 46. See also Nos. 33, 61, 62, 70.
42 Statement of Madison; Ford, Rise and growth of American Poli-
tics, 55.
4- Federalist, No. 78.
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insisting on this basis for dominating Congress. The statements
of Gouveneur Morris are typical. He said, in referring to this ap-
pointive power, that it would be possible now for the "loaves and
fishes (to) bribe the demagogues." 4 4 of the House of Representatives.
Although Morris had stated in the Convention that the President was
to act as the British minister,4 5 he and the other members of the
Convention went to great lengths to assure themselves that Congres-
sional control was not established. In the- Federalist, however, the
President was contrasted to the British king in order to convince the
voters of the inferior powers of the American executive. 4 6 In reality,
he held infinitely greater preponderance than king and cabinet
combined.
It was the motive of the framers not only to place the President
in complete control of the administration entirely independent of Con-
gress, but, also, to make him in truth the dominant legislative power
even though the actual routine enactment was vested in Congress.
He was to be responsible for national policy, and this conception of
his office was clearly carried out from the start. On one occasion
President Jefferson was severely rebuked by Rufus King because he
did not assume responsibility for national policy instead of allowing
such determination to be made by inexperienced members of Con-
gress. 47 However, the framers had vested such powers in the Presi-
dent that Congress became a helpless, incoherent, incompetent body.
And, when a nationwide demand arose for democratic control of the
government, the presidency was sought as the only governmental insti-
tution capable of exercising popular will.
Woodrow Wilson, in speaking of this interpretation of the separa-
tion of powers declared:
"The main purpose of the Convention of 1787 seems to
have been to accomplish this grevious mistake, 'The literary
theory' of checks and balances is simply a consistent account
of what our constitution-makers tried to do; and those checks
and balances have proved mischievous just to the extent to
which they have succeeded in establishing themselves as
realites."
48
Up to the administration of Andrew Jackson, notwithstanding the
position given the President by the framers, the House of Representa-
tives held a position in national affairs similar to the British parlia-
ment. Although never really as important as the latter, it was con-
sidered by far the most important branch of the government. 4 9  One
reason for this was that popular opinion of the nation at that early
period looked askance at the powerful office of the President and saw
in the lower house the real source of representation of their desires.
The beginning of the Jacksonian era saw a complete revolution-
izing of our constitutional structure of more consequence than any
constitutional change since the adoption of the Constitution. At this
time, the constitutional principle was formulated that the President
44 Madison's Journal, July 2.
4s Id., July 24.
4s6 Federalist, No. 66.
47 Life and correspondence of Rufus King, IV, 48L
49 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional government, 285.
49 "For the first thirty years it (H. of R.) was the controlling branch
of the government."-Benton,Thirty years view.
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represented the people as a whole as Congress represented the var-
ious portions.50 Henceforth, the presidency has been considered the
most important representative institution and political organ of the
American government. Although once the seat of party authority, the
maker and controller of Presidents and administrations, the House
of Representatives has sunk into insignificance.
The causes for the President's rise to power at this time are well
known. The period is remembered for the beginning of the party
nominating convention and the spoils system. Its concomitants were
the powerful political machines professional politicians, invisible gov-
ernment, boodle, enormous campaign funds, the wild scramble for
victory at the polls, the submergence of vital issues which would divide
support, the capitalization of personalities. But this change did not
occur without opposition. Clay, Calhoun, and Webster, the states-
men of the day, violently demanded legislative supremacy. Accord-
ing to Webster, "The contest for ages has been to rescue liberty from
the grasp of executive power .... To this end all that could be gained
from the imprudence, snatched from the weakness or wrung from the
necessities of crowned heads, has been carefully gathered up, secured
and hoarded, as the rich treasures, the very jewels of liberty." He
referred to the executive as a lion which must be caged" and "our
very security depends upon our watchfulness of it. It touches every-
thing, moves everything controls everything." 5 31 Clay charged that
"the power of the President was felt from one extremity to the other
of this vast republic. By means of principles which he has introduced
and innovations which he has made in our institutions, alas! but too
much countenanced by Congress and a confiding people, he exercises
uncontrolled the power of the state .... Myriads of dependants and
partisans, scattered over the land, are ever ready to sing hosannas to
him, and to laud to the skies whatever he does. He has swept over the
government during the last eight years like a tropical tornado. Every
department exhibits traces of the ravages of the storm."52 Calhoun
insisted that Congress was "the great control point where all power
must receive its sanction and direction."
5 8
Jacksonian democracy meant the control of the presidency by the
political machine. Having this control, the party had nothing to ask
of Congress but obedience and subservience. "With the 'legislative
caucus' died the last vestige of responsible leadership .... Every page
of our history since the days of Jackson fairly shouts boss rule." 54
The presidency became the dominant political power, the center of
party authority, and the House became the meek servile political agent
which it has remained to the present.
The legislative and political powers of the presidency have grown
by leaps and bounds. The administrative powers of the President
would naturally be supposed to have increased in proportion. On the
contrary, in spite of the constant acquisition by the executive depart-
ment of multifarious functions, the President himself per-
forms few actual administrative activities. Almost the entire
Bo Message of President Polk, Dec. 5, 1848, Richardson, Messages and
papers of the Presidents, IV, 664-5.
5x Congressional Debates, Vol. X pt. II, p, 1681 (1834).
51 Id., XIII, pt. II, 438, (1837).
5a Merriam, American political theories, 180.
ao Cleveland and Buck, The budget and responsible government, 62.
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time of the president is filled by carrying out duties of an honorary or
political nature. Even if he were disposed to oversee the opera-
tions of the administration he could perform the work only in a most
superficial manner because of the enormous and intricate character
of the federal administrative services.5 5 If President Washington
found it necessary to turn over the administration of the executive
departments to his department heads, how much more necessary now.
In his classic Congressional government, Woodrow Wilson, indicated:
"The President is powerful rather as a branch of the legislative than
as a titular head of the executive department." 5o This is true in spite
of the fact that he should be part of the administrative rather than
the political machinery of government. Since popular government
cannot function without the "unqualified obedience" of the executive
to Congress, Wilson contended that the President, the cabinet and all
other executive officials ought to hold office for an indefinite tenure.
"It is a positive disadvantage that (the department heads) should be
chosen upon such a principle (of spoils)." They should be "perman-
ent officials separated from partisan conflicts of politics."56 Al-
though the details of the relations of chief executives to cabinet mem-
bers will be considered elsewhere, it is essential to realize that the state
reorganization adherents run directly contrary to these fundamentals
in their advocacy of the selection of the important officials in the
civil service on the basis of political partisanship.
All political observers do not agree that the President occupies a
dominant if not dictatorial position in American government. Gamal-
iel Bradford, for example, in his two lengthy volumes upon The lessons
of popular government, has taken the attitude that the source of the
evils in the federal government is the encroachment of Congress upon
the executive.
"It has been observed that while presidential elections as
a whole are tending to raise the character of the people, other
influnces are tending even more particularly to drag it down.
These may be'summed up from a political point of view in
the anarchy resulting from the suppression of executive power
and the absorption of all government by the legislature, a
force which is certain in the long run, unless some stand
is taken against it to assert its superiority over all others."
5 7
To be sure Congress possesses a vestige of power over the Presi-
dent but only a vestige. Such power as it has must be manifested
through one of its two main functions-the "informing function" and
the "legislative function." Of these two the "informing function"
is the more vital in popular government. Yet "there is no similar
legislature in existence which is so shut up to the one business of
law making as is our Congress." Hence, Congress should not be
censured too severely, when it "fails to check evil courses on the partof the executive," because "they have been denied the means of
°5 Woodrow Wilson, op. cit., 260.
56 Id., 260.
5eId., 267-8: "Party government can exist only when the absolute
control of administration, the appointment of its officers as well as the
direction of its means and policy, is given immediately into the hands of
that branch of the government whose power is paramount, the represen-
tative body."
511Bradford, The lessons of popular government, 381.
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doing so." 5 8  The President has no fear of such powers as impeach-
ment, control of the purse, and investigative authority. It has been
recognized since Jefferson's time that "impeachment is not even a
scarecrow." Congress, being unable to control the acts of the execu-
tive, attempts to lay down the details of administration in the laws.
Thus it may hamper the administration by enacting legislation which
goes into great detail in setting forth the duties of the officials, by
minutely itemizing appropriation bills, and stating exact salaries of
employes. It may conduct partisan investigations and hold sensa-
tional hearings in hopes of subduing political opponents or of turning
public opinion against the executive and his administration to such a
degree that "the rascals would be turned out" at the next election.
Indeed, if the corruption is sufficiently flagrant and nauseating, the
investigating committees may arouse public indignation to such a pitch
that the President will compromise his position by removing the guilty
from office. But the "limitations and insufficiency" of such inquisi-
torial powers are manifest.5 9
Not only is the President unafraid of the "informing function"
of Congress, but he has even less fear of the "legislative function"
because he commands party policy. Those who denounce Congres-
sional encroachments upon the executive recall the statement of Mad-
ison in the Federal Convention and his remarks in the Federalist.6o
But Madison was not reckoning with political parties, and when the
parties concentrate most of their energies on the conduct of the execu-
tive department his argument falls to the ground. The veto power
and the Supreme Court's authority to declare laws unconstitutional
are only negative checks, while the patronage power, the party whip
and caucus are positive instruments making the presidency paramount
and Congress impotent. This is not all. When the President finds
laws not to his liking, he need not enforce them or he may appoint
administrators who will not execute them in accordance with the will
of Congress. This presidential practice of "boring from within" has
gone to such lengths that members of Congress instrumental in the
passage of the laws in question have actually advocated their repeal.
It is this all-powerful nature of the office, not the strenuous
personality of the incumbent, that makes the presidency the supreme
force. President Wilson who was denounced as dictator, could have
dominated the scene from no other position. The self-denying Taft
moulded Congress to suit his will. "And how the legislative depart-
ment has stammered and grown incoherent under the leadership of
normalcy and common sense."' If we can make any conclusions from
the past it is that there will be no accession of supermen to the office
of President, yet this is the only path under present institutions to
secure anything approaching popular control of administration. "We
secure Caesars by accident, their tenure is not determined by quality.
The development of alternative connections is the prime constitutional
SWilson, op. cit., 297-8, 302, 303.
- Bradford, op. cit., 383.
e1 Jenks, "Control of administration by Congress," American Review,
II, 596. (See also Ford, op cit, 284: "The rise of presidential authority
cannot be accounted for by the intention of the Presidents; it is the
product of political conditions which dominate all departments of gov-
ernment so that Congress itself shows an unconscious disposition to
aggrandize the presidential office.")
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necessity of the time." 6 2 Until the remedy of direct responsibility of
the executive to the representative body is established, the present
inefficient and crude method of congressional investigation must con-
tinue as the only existing solution for an otherwise unendurable situa-
tion. When it is realized further that, through the force of social
conditions, more and more policy determining powers must be placed
in the hands of the administration, that. a movement is on foot to
muzzle the Senate, and that a recent Supreme Court decision has
divested the Senate of its control of removals from office, it will
become evident that congressional usurpation is just another political
bogey.
Although there are a few observers such as Bradford that warn
against the threat of congressional supremacy, the majority recognize
the reality of legislative impotence. Is it not significant that exper-
ienced statesmen who have watched the workings of the presidency
at close range have most strenuously attested its preponderance?
John Quincy Adams remarked "that the powers of the executive de-
partment, explicitly and emphatically concentrated in one person, are
vastly more extensive and complicated than those of the legislature."'63
According to Secretary Seward, "We elect a king for four years
and give him absolute power within certain limits which after all
he can interpret for himself."6 4  President Hayes declared, "Practi-
cally, the.President holds the nation in hand."
6 5
Some distinguished statesmen. have from time to time endeavored
to secure legislative control over the President but without avail.
Roger Sherman's efforts in the Federal Convention were fruitless. In
1833, Justice Story wrote: "If corruption ever eats its way silently
into the vitals of this republic, it will be because the people are unable
to bring responsibility home to the executive through his chosen
ministers."66 He urged, with no results, that, if the English system
of ministerial responsibility was not applied in principle, an attempt
should be made to approach it as nearly as possible by making cabinet
members ex-offico members of the House. In 1864-5, an effort
was made to pass a bill in the House for the purpose of securing seats
in Congress for cabinet members, and a similar bill in 1879-82 was
considered in the Senate by a committee including among others
James G. Blaine, 0. H. Platt and Geo. H. Pendleton. 6 7
Furthier historical evidence as to the ascendancy of the Presi-
dent seems hardly necessary. Under the administration of Cleve-
land and Roosevelt, the greatest exercise of this authority occurred.
When, during the latter administration, the big stick was swung ruth-
lessly, not another political force was in sight. But, in Wilson's
administration, the nearest approach to dictatorship under modern
popular government was reached. Senator Work spoke of the Wilson
government as follows:
"I come now to comment on what I consider one of the
most important questions that are confronting Congress
today, if not the most important of them all, and that is the
ez Jenks, op cit, ii, 602; Mill, op cit., 270.
08 J. Q. Adams, Discourse on the jubilee of the Constitution.
04 Ford, op cit., 291.
s Stevens, Sources of the Constitution, 167-79.
0 Story, On the Constitution, sec. 869.
07 Senate Report No. 837, 46 Cong., 3 Sess., (Feb. 4, 1881).
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evident purpose of the executive to dominate the legislative
branch of the government. I have had occasion to speak of
it before and since this administration came into power. It
was bad enough under previous administrations but in this
one it has increased a hundred fold over anything that has
been known in the past. This dominating influence has be-
come so insistent and continuous and has been submitted
to so slavishly by the majority of Congress, that the in-
dependence and usefulness of the legislative branch of gov-
ernment are both threatened. It has been so asserted and
exercised and obediently submitted to that we have come peril-
ously near a dictatorship. The President has not contented
himself by advising what measures should be considered by
Congress and vetoing them if they do not meet his approval
as the Constitution authorizes him to do. He has demanded
that certain legislation shall be enacted, has insisted that
Congress remain in session until the laws he insists upon are
enacted and the secret caucus is made the instrument with
which to enforce his will. As a consequence we have laws on
the statute books that are in effect and in reality executive
orders and not legislative acts. They are legislation of and
enacted by the executive department and not by Congress." 8
One modern authority closed his study of the presidency with
the statement: "American democracy has revived the oldest politi-
cal institution of the race, the elective kingship .... That the people
have been able to accomplish this with such defective apparatus, and
have been able to make good a principle which no other people have
been able to reconcile with the safety of the state, indicates the highest
degree of constitutional morality yet attained by any race."6
In spite of this formidable evidence showing presidential su-
premacy and irresponsibility to the representative body to be a fact,
the advocates of state reorganization have adopted this "federal plan"
as their model and ideal because they supposed it would enforce the
responsibility of the governor.
The establishment of the "federal plan" in 1789 effected a mark-
ed departure from the orthodox principles of constitutional organiza-
tion existing in the various states. Up to that time, legislative
supremacy was the ruling type. The experiences of the colonial legis-
latures with the royal governors had determined to a great extent the
mould of the political institutions when the colonies secured their inde-
pendence. The colonists had no voice in the selection of the colonial
governor who exercised an effective veto over popular will as ex-
pressed in the representative assembly. Hence, in the early constitu-
tions, the very natural jealousy of the governor was shown.'° His com-
plete subordination to the legislature was insured through his selection
by that body,, " through his sharing the executive power with the exe-
cutive council and the upper house and through the appointment of the
as Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 2 Sess., 4402, (Mar. 6, 1914).
6o Ford, op cit., 293.
7o Federalist, No. 46 Finley and Sanderson, American executives and
executive methods, 43.
7' Mass., New York, R. I., and Conn. were exceptions to this general
practice.
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executive council and most of the important executive officers by the
legislature.
This was all changed with the adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion. The prevailing type of direct executive responsibility to the
representative body was cast aside and in its place came the "federal
plan" of executive independence and irresponsibility to the legislature.
"The influence of the' federal example was immediate." 72 The
selection of the governor was transferred from the legislature to the
electorate. The executive council was abolished. The appointive
power rapidly passed from the hands of the legislature to the
governor.
The effect of this change upon the status of the State Legislature
was identical with the effect upon Congress of the popular selection
of the President. There should be no surprise in finding that hence-
forth the State representative assembly assumed a position of in-
significance. There was a proportionate growth of popular distrust of
the legislature. This development was natural because representative
assemblies invariably sink in character and competency when
separated from the executive. In the eyes of the people at large the
legislature appeared no longer to be their trusted representative and
protector. It was shorn of practically all of its prestige and power
and the governor became the dominant political and representative
institution. As the legislature lost power the political parties gained
power and it became their great aim in the State as in the federal
sphere to secure the election of the chief executive. All energies were
bent upon the election of the governor. The election of the repres-
entatives in the state legislature was of little significance in compari-
son. Having elected the governor, the real political head and
representative of the people as a whole, the parties found means of
throttling any opposition of individual members of the legislature.
Such maneuvers were justified on the basis that the governor had a
mandate from the country. Through the party bosses, the secret
party caucus, gag rule, lobbying, logrolling, spoils and patronage, all
opposition and insurgency was easily muzzled, and regularity and
conformity with executive policy was enforced. Such political con-
ditions as these were ripe for the development of a system controlled
by bosses, professional politicians and invisible party machines. Con-
sequently, the experience of the state government bears out the
general maxim of comparative government, that executive supremacy
goes hand in hand with powerful political machines and bosses. Indeed,
if it were not for such invisible government this type of govern-
ment would be unworkable.
"It is a distinct gain to public order, when no constitu-
tional provision exists for associating the legislative process
with administrative knowledge and intelligence, that private
enterprise steps in to provide a: refuge from chaos. The
escape of the United States from the ruin which is the usual
fate of constitutions that separate the executive manage-
ment from direct contact with the assembly, is doubtless to
7s Finley and Sanderson, op cit., 44; (Merriam, op cit., 183, does not
agree that executive supremacy started in federal government).
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be attributed to the way in which its politics have been
commercialized." 73
The governor's administrative as contrasted with his political
activities have not increased to any considerable degree although the
state administrative services have grown enormously. This is owing
to his extensive political, titular and honorary duties, the practice of
popular election of many state executive officers, and the establish-
ment of independent boards and commissions which relieve him from
much administrative responsibility. The outstanding conditions
leading to the poular election of an increasing number of executive
officials was undoubtedly the popular revolt of the people against
the bosses and the invisible party machine with its spoils and patron-
age. It was not realized that lengthening the ballot would only make
the machine and the boss more necessary and more powerful. The
prestige of the federal constitution precluded the extension of this
movement to the federal government.
The impotence of the governor as an administrative official is
attested upon every hand.
"Originally occupying about the same relative position
as the President, the governor has been stripped of his admin-
istrative power and confined to the exercise of political
powers. . . . It has become impossible for the governor
to become the head of the commonwealth administration
because the people have decided that he shall be in the main
a political officer. They have lessened his power of appoint-
ment. They have almost destroyed his power of removal.
He has been unable to develop any power of direction. The
governor's office has been deprived of all means of admin-
istrative development." 74
Recently efforts have been made to restore the governor to his
original status as it was under the true "federal plan." The
effort to make him once again the only elected executive officer is
known as the short ballot movement. (It is not the aim of this
movement to shorten the ballot to the extent of making the chief
executive appointive in the municipal state or federal sphere.)
The effort to abolish all independent commissions in order to make
the governor solely responsible is known as the state reorganization
movement. But even had the governor full administrative powers
and responsibility, had been relieved of the titular and political duties
of the office, and was a thoroughly competent administrator (quali-
fications conspicuously lacking in any popularly elected official), he
would still be unable to direct the administration in any more than
a superficial manner because of the enormity and intricacy of the
administrative services.
It is in accord with the fundamental philosophy of government
and with the experience under the U. S. "federal plan" to conclude
that as long as the governor remains a popularly elected official in-
dependent of the legislature, it is not only inevitable but it is desirable
that he occupy the following status: He will be the supreme political
power of the government. He will be maintained in power by the
vs Ford, Representative government, 240.
Y4 Goodnow, Comparative administrative law, 81. President's admin-
istrative functions supra, 21.
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW 31
force of invisible bosses and party spoils. He will bear no real
responsibility for administrative operations. To the extent that the
recent state reorganization movement, which accepts the "federal
plan" as its ideal, has endeavored to alter this status, it has failed
and will continue to fail. The teachings of political philosophers for
ages past convict the reorganization scheme as false. The lessons
of a century under the "federal plan" denies the validity of its
promise.
(To Be Continued)
